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I.  THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
The Spring 2005 issue of the Yale Law Journal published a 
lengthy review by New York University Law School Profesor Frank 
K. Upham1 of my book, Sending Law to the Countryside.  Professor 
Upham’s central criticisms are two: first, my “uncritical acceptance of 
a linear version of modernization theory,”2 a criticism that I will not 
address in this essay; and second, my “greatest flaw,” “the absence of 
politics and political power.”  My work, he says, “is reticent to the 
point of timidity when it comes to politics,” “[a]side from the small-p 
politics,”3 by which he appears to mean the internal conflicts and 
interpersonal quarrels of the workplace.  I emphasize these words to 
show that Professor Upham intends to make his point absolutely clear 
and forestall any possible misunderstanding of the word by readers.  
Moreover, his choice of the word “timidity” implicates the author’s 
academic honesty in the political dominance of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). 
Contrary to Professor Upham’s characterization, my book 
actually repeatedly reveals the influence on the judiciary of politics, 
 
 * Professor of Law, Dean of Peking University Law School.  L.L.B. (Peking University, 
1982); L.L.M. (McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1987); M.A. (Arizona State 
University, 1989); and Ph.D. (Arizona State University, 1992).  The Chinese version of this 
paper was presented at the “Constitutionalism and the Judicial Power in China” conference, 
organized by the Sciences Po and the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) 
and held on December 12-13, 2005, Paris, France.  I am grateful for the valuable comments and 
suggestion of participants of the conference. 
 1. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep?  Justice in 
Rural China, 114 YALE L. J. 1675 (2005) (reviewing ZHU SULI, SENDING LAW TO THE 
COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA’S BASIC LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2000)). 
 2. Id. at 1700. 
 3. Id. at 1698, 1703 (emphasis added). 
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especially the CCP’s policies, including local Party organizations’ 
multifarious interference in cases.  This coverage is most evident in 
Part I of the book, which analyzes the influence of politics over 
judiciary from macro, middle, and micro levels.  Chapter I projects 
the sending of the law to the countryside as an extension of the power 
of the nation-state to the basic level of society and points out that the 
judicial system in contemporary China assumes a political role.  
Chapter II discusses how the political control over judicial affairs is 
possible through the judicial administration within the courts and the 
judicial system.  Chapter III focuses on the adjudication committee 
(shenpan weiyuanhui), a judicial organization within each court 
designed to deal—at least according to statutory law—with hard and 
important cases, and analyzes the multiple function of this micro 
institution within courts.  Other chapters also have abundant analysis 
of politics and political power.4  Thus, while I may not meet Prof. 
Upham’s expectations about how much discussion there should be of 
politics and political power, his judgment that there is none at all is 
without foundation. 
Certainly, such analyses may not be enough and should be 
extended by other research.  However, I want to emphasize that I 
wrote the book in Chinese for a Chinese audience and never intended 
it to satisfy the political and ideological tastes of any foreign readers; 
Professor Upham’s frustration or dissatisfaction is therefore 
understandable. 
Nevertheless, Professor Upham’s review attracted my attention 
and needs to be countered, not because he has any new insights or 
makes any contribution to the study of law in China, but rather 
because his errors in methodology are typical of some Western 
observers of China and are influential in China.  Such errors reveal 
not only the deep ideological bias that is central to the “moral 
authority” of the Western notion of the autonomy of law and “rule of 
law” (a shaky authority that has evaporated after 9/11), but also a 
theoretical mistake that is common in comparative or implicitly 
comparative studies of China.  In other words, it is the impact of these 
and similar errors on recent legal studies in China over the recent 
decades that has prompted me to write this response.  Moreover, 
precisely because Upham’s errors are characteristic of the 
shortcomings in analyses of Chinese law, this essay is not simply a 
 
 4. ZHU SULI, SENDING LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA’S BASIC 
LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM chs. 7, 10, 14 (2000)). 
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response to Upham’s book review, but also a paper of its own 
independent significance. 
II.  IS A DISTINCTION NECESSARY? 
Professor Upham’s criticism of my work as failing to address 
politics and political power is internally illogical and contradictory 
because his review also acknowledges, at least implicitly, that I did 
analyze the influence of various social actors, including the Party and 
government, upon the operation of basic courts.  So, what then is 
Professor Upham’s complaint?  A careful reading suggests that what 
troubles Professor Upham is my failure to devote a chapter or 
chapters to a relatively systematic analysis of the CCP’s interference 
in the operation of basic level courts.  As I already noted, this charge 
is untrue.  However, even if the criticism were valid, we need to note 
that it is based on three implicit presuppositions: first, that there is a 
unique political influence that comes purely from the CCP; second, 
that it is possible to create a standard model of a judiciary free from 
political influence or meddling; and third, that it is possible and 
necessary for researchers to examine and measure independently 
such influence.  All three presuppositions are unrealistic. 
In my own view, and in the view (explicit and implicit) of many 
Chinese and foreign scholars, the CCP’s influence and control is 
ubiquitous; it penetrates every aspect of society.  Despite the many 
political differences between the CCP and its former arch-rival, the 
Nationalist Party (known as the Guomindang or GMD) and despite 
the fact that the CCP never used the GMD’s often deployed concept 
of the “party-state,” in practice, the CCP inherited the political 
tradition, initiated by Sun Yat-sen5 and pursued by the GMD, 
comprised of a “party construction of the state,” “party rule of the 
state,” and “party above the state.”  Indeed, eventually, the CCP’s 
influence over society and the machinery of the state would far 
exceed that achieved by the GMD. 
The evidence is abundant.  First, during the GMD’s rule of 
mainland China (1927-1949), political control of entire regions 
remained in the hands of provincial strongmen or warlords, and the 
 
 5. Sun Yat-sen was the first President of the Republic of China, and founder and leader of 
the GMD.  SUN ZHONGSHAN, SUN ZHONGSHAN QUANJI [COMPLETE WORKS OF SUN YAT-
SEN], vol. 8, at 267-68, vol. 9, at 103-04 (1986). 
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GMD’s unification of China was more symbolic than real.6  Second, 
the same was true of political parties.  Whether or not the GMD 
wanted to recognize it at the time, even during the GMD’s rule, the 
CCP occupied a considerable amount of territory, enjoyed the 
support of a large number of the people, and controlled independent 
armed military forces.  There were, as well, some other smaller 
political parties.  Third, in the Nationalist government, even within 
the GMD itself, there was a group of relatively independent and 
socially influential scholars and technocrats.  Fourth, because of the 
GMD’s weakness, to a certain extent the traditional model of social 
control being exercised by a combination of imperial (central) and 
gentry (local elite) power persisted, with the central government 
having rather weak influence in rural China.7  In conclusion, the 
GMD built only a superstructure and did not, because it could not, 
implement its will and policies down to the lowest levels of society.8  
Indeed, this inability to achieve its goal of social transformation is 
what led to the GMD’s loss of the mainland in 1949. 
In the judiciary, too, the GMD fruitlessly sought to establish total 
control.  From its earliest years, even before it had established 
national political control, the GMD insisted on “partyization of the 
judiciary” (sifa danghua).  Subsequently, it continued to adopt 
systematic measures in this regard, 9 and there is evidence to show 
that in some cases, the GMD exercised strong direct control.10  
 
 6. 2 DENG XIAOPING XUANJI [SELECTED READINGS OF DENG XIAOPING] 299 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 7. FEI XIAOTONG, HUANGQUAN HE SHENQUAN [IMPERIAL POWER AND GENTRY 
POWER] (1988). 
 8. Some historical researchers testify that conflicts between GMD local branches and 
local governments always ended with the victory of local governments during the GMD’s rule.  
Cf. Wang Xianzhi, Kangzhan shiqi guomindang zuzhi jianshe yu zuzhi fazhan de jige wenti 
[Issues on GMD’s Organizational Construction and Development During the Anti-Japanese 
War], 1990 JINDAISHI YANJIU, no. 2, at 230-50 (1990); Zhongshen & Tang Sengshu, Shilun 
Nanjing guomin zhengfu xunzheng qianqi (1928-1937) de difang dangzheng jiufeng [The Local 
Party-Government Conflicts in Early Tutelary Period (1928-1937) of Nanjing National 
Government], 1999 SHIXUE YUEKAN, no. 2, at 53-58(1999). 
 9. The earliest recorded statement available referring to partyization was made by Xuqian 
in 1926; Ju Zheng, a founding member of GMD and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
National Government, elaborated it in 1934.  According to Ju Zheng, partyization has three 
criteria: all judicial personnel must be GMD’s members; GMD policies must be applied in 
adjudications; and all the judges must accept the Three People’s Principles (the political 
ideology of GMD).  Ju Zheng, Sifa danghua wenti [On Partyization of the Judiciary], 1934 
DONGFANG ZAZHI, no. 10 (1934). 
 10. Cf. WO SUO ZHIDAO DE HANJIAN ZHOU FUHAI [TRAITOR ZHOU FUHAI, AS I KNOW] 
(Wen Fei ed., 2005); WO SUO ZHIDAO DE HANJIAN CHEN GONGBO [TRAITOR CHEN GONGBO, 
AS I KNOW] (Wen Fei ed., 2005). 
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However, this insistence on partyization demonstrated that the 
GMD’s control and influence over the judiciary was not complete.  
Because of this reality, it would be possible, though still very difficult, 
to distinguish GMD influence from other political or governmental 
influence. 
In the years immediately following the CCP’s assumption of 
power in 1949, such a distinction became impossible—not because the 
CCP’s influence weakened but rather because it was too strong.  First 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became a modern, nationalist 
state with a high degree of political, economic and cultural unity.  
Only Taiwan was under the control of the Nationalist government, 
and there were no regional strongmen.  Second, although there were 
other legal, democratic parties, they all existed under the leadership 
of the CCP.  Even after the space for these democratic parties’ 
political activities expanded following the reform and “opening up” in 
1978, the 1982 constitution provides that the system is still one of 
cooperation and consultation by multiple parties under the leadership 
of the CCP.11  Through various formal (for example, the Chinese 
Political Consultative Congress) and informal irregular meetings with 
non-party figures and institutions, the CCP gathers and selectively 
adopts the political advice of other political parties.  Some leaders of 
these democratic parties are also CCP members.12  Third, the vast 
majority of social elites, whether in government, universities, 
commerce, or social organizations, are party members.  Other elites 
who are not party members accept the political leadership of CCP 
and most of them are staunch communists.13  Finally, within the CCP 
are some “radicals,” whose political views might be considered 
dissident by Westerners.  In this sense, though the Party consistently 
proclaims itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat and the working 
class, and describes its highest ideal and ultimate aim to be the 
realization of communism,14 even before the declaration of “the three 
 
 11. XIAN FA [Constitution] pmbl., para. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
 12. As far as I know, the former or current leaders of such political parties as Democratic 
League, China National Democratic Consultation Association, Zi Gong Party, and Taiwan 
Democratic Self-government League were or are CCP members. 
 13. Two examples are the late and only non-CCP Vice Presidents of PRC: Song Qinqlin, 
wife of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, applied and was approved for membership in the CCP right before her 
death; and Rong Yiren, China’s leading “red capitalist,” was identified in a New China News 
Agency obituary as a “solider for communism.” 
 14. 16TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 
general princs. (2002) [hereinafter CCP CONST.]. 
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representatives,”15 the Party also emphasizes that it was the vanguard 
of the entire Chinese people and that it sought to represent the 
interests of the greatest number of people.16  In this sense, the CCP is 
another “nationalist” party.  Its political program, despite having 
suffered mistakes of the right and the left (including the serious 
mistake of the Cultural Revolution), is widely accepted by the people. 
Owing to the CCP’s political program and tight organizational 
structure, its influence is ubiquitous at every level and in every aspect 
of contemporary Chinese society; it determines the direction of 
society and government.  Though there may be differences and 
conflicts within the party-state, there is no external influence on the 
government other than the Party: there is no such thing as 
government policy independent from the CCP; there is nothing else 
truly influential, not even the military policy imagined by Western 
scholars.  In this view, as a matter of fact, the CCP is not only the 
strength at the core of every undertaking in China, it is also the also 
the mechanism for the mobilization, integration, and political 
representation of all social forces and classes of PRC.  In 
contemporary China, nearly every political force has either been 
integrated into the CCP, or, as in the case of former and present 
capitalists, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), denied political expression.  
However, in the more than two decades since China began its reform 
and “opening up” in 1978, and especially following the inclusion of 
the concept of the “the three representatives” in the Party’s and 
PRC’s constitutions, the CCP has pursued becoming a governing 
party that represents the basic interests of the greatest number of 
people and that has daily strengthened its ability as a governing 
party.17 
Therefore, distinguishing the status of party and government 
officials is truly not that important.  At every administrative level in 
the PRC, the head of the administrative unit is not only a party 
member, but the number two leader (for example, the deputy party 
 
 15. It is emphasized that CCP represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese people, represents the development trend of China’s advanced 
productive forces, and represents the orientation of China’s advanced culture.  It is widely 
considered an important change of CCP in terms of its organizational constitution and political 
ideology. 
 16. Cf. 7TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 
(1945); 8TH CCP NAT’L CONF., CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (1956). 
 17. XIAN FA art. 1 (1982). 
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secretary) of the party organization at that level, while among the 
deputy leaders of an administrative unit (for example, Vice Mayor of 
a city), only one person is generally not a party member.  Party and 
governmental officials are interchangeable, for example, most 
governors eventually assume a position as provincial Party secretary, 
and many provincial Party secretaries have previously served as 
governors or other officials.  This is the pattern from the center down 
to the lowest level.  Indeed, historically, few officials who have 
specialized in or worked only in Party affairs and never in the 
government enter the highest, core policy-making positions of the 
Party organization. 
This pattern holds true all the branches of government and 
administration regardless of the breadth of their responsibilities.  For 
example, at all levels of government, from the municipal to the 
national, the chairs of the People’s Congresses and People’s Political 
Consultative Conferences, as well as the chiefs of all but a few 
government agencies, are the party secretaries of the leading party 
group18 in those units.19 
The institutions charged with administering justice (the People’s 
Courts and People’s Procuratorates) are certainly no exception.  
Since 1949, all the Presidents of the People’s Supreme Court and the 
Chief Procurator of the Supreme Procuratorate, except Shen Junru, 
the first President of People’s Supreme Court, have been CCP 
members and secretaries of the leading Party group of the 
organization.  Although there is commonly a non-CCP-member Vice 
President or Deputy Procurator, they are all carefully selected by the 
CCP organizational branch and trusted by the CCP; in some 
particularly important policy decisions, these non-Party officials may 
be invited to participate in an expanded meeting of the leading party 
group of their institution. 
Given such a structure, it is not only hard to distinguish among 
social, administrative, or Party interference in the judicial system and 
its operation, it is also unnecessary to make this distinction.  To insist 
on the distinction is to apply a standard Western model of a judiciary, 
inapposite for China.  It fits China into a procrustean bed, akin to 
“cutting one’s feet to fit shoes” or “marking a boat to see where one 
has dropped a knife in a river.”  This sort of “research” is not only 
 
 18. A leading party group is a CCP organization set in a state organ, people’s organization, 
and other non-party organization. 
 19. Currently, probably the foreign ministry is the only exception. 
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meaningless; it also blurs and confuses the real problems to be dealt 
with in the Chinese judicial system and can, moreover, lead to 
mistaken solutions.  In my view, what is truly important is for us to 
discover, examine, and study concretely the shortcomings and merits 
of influence on and interference in the legal system (whatever its 
sources), and to determine how to adjust and improve the 
performance of China’s judiciary, as well as make it just, efficient, and 
effective. 
It should be pointed out that because of the Party’s ubiquitous 
institutional presence and because of the nature of the social 
revolution in China, the Party’s organizations and leaders (through 
administrative and other agencies) have directly and indirectly 
influenced, interfered in, and even at times manipulated the judicial 
process.  However, we cannot, indeed, we should not, simply look at 
this as unfair interference.  To be sure, the Party’s mistaken 
interference in the judicial system and its policy errors have led to 
some disastrous consequences.  Yet even during the most extreme 
moments, such as Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), there were CCP 
organizations and officials, who, within the scope of their ability and 
influence, prevented and reduced the unfairness or radicalism in some 
cases, including instances in the judicial sphere.  Although today it is 
quite popular to attribute all the problems of the PRC to the CCP or 
the revolution led by the CCP, it is hard to imagine that the current 
state of Chinese society and the judicial system would necessarily be 
better off without the modern revolution and economic development 
led by the CCP.  This is a counterfactual, and I will not develop the 
argument here; I am willing to let history be the final judge.  
However, if one thinks the revolution led by the CCP was inevitable 
and on balance improved China, then one has to accept the CCP and 
its modeling of China’s modern judiciary.  Though we can argue 
about whether the costs are worth it, there are no benefits without 
costs. 
Today, although the CCP has adopted “relying on law to rule the 
country” (yifa zhiguo) and judicial independence is inscribed in the 
Constitution, party organizations and individuals persist in 
influencing and interfering with the judiciary.  However, although 
these interferers are sometimes leading cadres who “wave the flag” of 
the local Party organization, it does not mean that this individual’s 
interference represents the Party’s or that particular party 
organization’s interference.  To the contrary, some of them are 
violating CCP principles, policies, and disciplinary rules.  A county 
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Party chief may interfere with a county court’s handling of a case; if 
he or she acts out of personal interest, it is illegal; if the action is 
driven by “local interest,” it is at a minimum unfair and 
inappropriate.  The Court or Procuratorate has a basis in law and 
Party disciplinary rules to reject such interference, and both 
institutions have certainly resisted this sort of meddling, though not 
always successfully.20  Moreover, sometimes the party’s apparent 
interference is merely issuing an opinion (pishi) as a response to a 
“hot” social issue.  Even in the absence of this opinion, the relevant 
court, acting solely on the basis of the law, would have reached a 
similar result.  In a sense, the Party’s issuing an opinion is simply a 
necessary political or public relations gesture by the CCP, acting in its 
role as the governing party that is serving the people.  It is a necessary 
political strategy that shows responsiveness to outcries from the 
people.  Such gestures certainly do not fit the model of separation of 
powers and are often criticized by many legal scholars who, based on 
their knowledge of Western judicial practices, think that the CCP 
should keep quiet about a case awaiting trial.  Yet maybe the gesture 
is necessary for the majority of Chinese people who are not interested 
in foreign comparisons, and want merely justice and social solidarity.  
From a legal perspective, I find the Party’s interference unjustified 
and sometimes am disposed to join in the criticism.  However, from a 
political perspective and from an objective or neutral position, I do 
not see why the legal perspective is necessarily more moral and more 
reasonable than the political perspective, and why the judicial 
position should always be privileged over the political position.  
Perhaps, my position is tendentious and conflicts with my self-interest 
as a legal professional.  However, in my view, the Party’s interference 
may reasonably be seen as a performance of its political functions of 
social integration and representation. 
Another difficulty in making a distinction is that an 
administrative agency’s interference may be arising directly or 
indirectly from a CCP decision or policy determination.  For example, 
in order to attract foreign investment, a local Party organization, the 
local government, or government agencies may instruct (zhishi) the 
local court to “take care of” (zhaogu) a foreign investor in a 
particular case.  Such actions do not comport with a pure model of 
judicial autonomy, but at the same time, the local Standing 
Committee of People’s Congress or other government agencies may 
 
 20. See ZHU, supra note 4, at 129-31, where I analyze such cases. 
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enact a local statute of general applicability that requires local courts 
to implement the CCP policy of encouraging economic development.  
Regardless of the form it takes, this sort of interference cannot be 
said to come from the government rather than the Party because it is, 
in fact, reflecting the political judgments and decisions of the Party 
center or its local branches.  When we turn to the real world to look 
closely at how such influence is exercised, we find an even more 
complicated situation.  In general, one can say that the final decision-
making power lies in the CCP.  However, at the level of everyday 
experience, whether interference comes from the Party, the 
government, the People’s Congress, or the media or individuals 
within them all depends upon the position and actual influence of the 
interfering party, upon the institutions he or she thinks is the most 
effective instrument for intervening, and upon the actual channels he 
or she uses to affect the court’s judgment.  It is not always a CCP 
organization that is the most influential in such matters.  Like other 
people, the Chinese are very practical.  They will try anything and 
everything they think might be effective at exerting influence on the 
courts.  Distinctions among the Party, government, People’s 
Congress, or the mass media are not made.  Nor are distinctions 
between lawful and unlawful methods, such as personal connections 
with and even bribery of judges. 
Even within the judiciary (Courts and Procuratorates), there are 
various legal, semi-legal, and illegal interferences, both legal and 
administrative in nature.  Sometimes, it is hard to determine whether 
the influence is Party or non-Party, institutional or personal, or legal 
or administrative.  A Supreme People’s Court’s decision, even a 
judicial interpretation from its adjudication committee, the most 
professional organ within the Court, may still be a response to a 
policy decision by the Central Committee of CCP.  For example, in 
December 2003, Supreme Court President Xiao Yang announced that 
the Court had issued a “leading opinion” (zhidao yijian) following 
intensive study by the Court’s Party branch of a statement from Hu 
Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP.21  In this case, it was not simply 
a matter of restating a CCP Central Committee policy.  Rather, the 
decision addressed a real, pervasive internal problem of the court 
system.  Moreover, a higher court judge or judges’ unfair reversal of a 
lower level decision may be a product of undue social influences on 
those higher court judges disguised with CCP rhetoric. Finally, even if 
 
 21. LIAOWANG XINWEN ZHOUKAN, Oct. 13, 2003, at 20. 
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the Party interferes in a particular case, for example, through the 
increasingly less common practice of utilizing the Party secretary of 
the politics and law committee (zhengfa wei), the instructions, though 
written, are general rather than specific.  Like any other texts, they 
need interpretation.  Is such interference an interference, and in what 
sense?  Actually, judges who try such cases may use such an 
instruction to hide their personal judgment, even their partiality. 
Accordingly, I conclude, first, that the influence of the CCP upon 
the judiciary is general and diffuse; it comes not only from party 
institutions and party leaders, but also through many other avenues.  
Second, although the CCP has its own ideology and exercises 
significant influence on the judiciary, taken as a whole, this ideology 
is not necessarily incompatible with the general view of justice shared 
by ordinary people.  The organizational principles of the CCP are in 
conflict with the operation of professional logic in the legal/judicial 
system, but in concert with China’s social development, the 
legal/judicial profession in China is institutionalizing itself.  Third, as a 
concrete, operating political party within society, the CCP is not 
essentialist; every sort of person, interest group, and political force 
may try to use the mechanism of the Party to influence or interfere in 
the operation of the judiciary.  Their actions have both a positive and 
negative affect on the formation and development of the judicial 
system.  Fourth, on the level of everyday life, not only is it difficult to 
identify the pure party interference, it is also important to note that 
such interference has a strongly pragmatic and opportunistic 
character.  Therefore, I would argue that separating Party 
interference from other interference cannot further our 
understanding of the operation of the basic level legal system.  
Moreover, other than exacerbating an ideological and essentialist 
understanding of the CCP and China, such distinctions have no 
intellectual significance. 
III.  WHAT IS THE FRAME OF REFERENCE? 
Even it were possible to identify a purely Party influence, such 
research is untenable because of the problem of an implied frame of 
reference.  Indeed, there are many flaws in the PRC’s judiciary, and 
they are probably attributable to the CCP’s ideology.  However, I 
prefer to trace them to the unprecedented social transformation of 
China during the last one hundred years.  One of my aims in writing 
Sending Law to the Countryside was to try to identify and find 
solutions for these flaws.  Perhaps, because my effort was insufficient, 
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my analysis not trenchant, my vision too narrow, indeed blind in 
places, my work has its shortcomings.  Nevertheless, it is hard to 
construct, indeed even to imagine, a standard frame of reference, 
whether experiential or ideal, for the political-judicial relationship 
that could be used to objectively measure the CCP’s influence and 
interference at the basic level of the judiciary and then evaluate the 
pros and cons of such influence. 
All modern countries have political parties, which despite the 
commonly recognized principle of judicial independence, influence or 
interfere in judicial matters in various ways.  The extent of the 
phenomenon may be less than in China, but it is nonetheless fairly 
common.  Actually, without the active participation and influence of 
political parties, it is hard to imagine the existence or perpetuation of 
an institutional judicial independence.  My language may seem a bit 
cynical, but it describes a historical and contemporary reality.  Was it 
not out of loyalty to the Federalist Party and determined resistance to 
the Republic-Democratic Party that Chief Justice Marshall created 
the system of judicial review, which serves as the core of American 
judicial independence?22 
Some may dismiss my example as characteristic of the early stage 
of judicial independence.  However, even in many Western countries 
today, judicial independence depends on and indeed is guaranteed to 
a great extent by party politics.  Without party politics there would be 
no judicial independence in these countries.  For example, in the 
United States, the two political parties exert influence on the courts 
and judicial process through the system in which the Senate advises 
and consents to the President’s nomination of federal judges.  Also, as 
the example of the Warren Court shows, some American judges 
voluntarily make their judgments in accord with their party’s 
ideology.  In addition, some states have institutions of election and 
recall.23  To different degrees, all these institutions and practices are 
influenced by party politics.  Personally, I regard these political 
parties’ influence on the judicial system as generally acceptable and 
lawful.  Moreover, I recognize that neither in degree nor character 
 
 22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS 
FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 206-09 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).  I discuss the background of 
Marbury v. Madison in Zhiddu ruhe xingchengde? [How was the System Formed?], 1998 
BIJIAOFA YANJIU [RES. IN COMP. L.], no. 1 (1998). 
 23. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 37-42 (7th ed. 1998). 
10__BERNSTEIN_LECTURE.DOC 10/4/2007  9:59:16 AM 
2007] POLITICAL PARIES IN CHINA’S JUDICIARY 545 
can they be equated to the political influence or interference to which 
Chinese judges are subject.  However, the acceptance by Upham and 
me, as well as by many others of the ineluctability of parties’ political 
interference does not mean that we can deny that it is indeed political 
influence. 
“Many” does not mean everyone or on all issues.  In America, 
there have been instances of what Judge Robert Bork and other 
scholars regard as egregious interference—for example, the struggle 
in 1987 between Republicans and Democrats over President Reagan’s 
nomination of Bork to the Supreme Court.  At least Judge Bork 
regarded it as inappropriate interference, or in his words, a “political 
seduction of the law.”24  Is this an overstatement prompted by Judge 
Bork’s anger?  Let us imagine an alternative outcome in which a 
Republican-dominated Senate confirmed Bork.  In the eyes of 
adamant Bork opponents Senator Ted Kennedy and Senator Joseph 
Biden, who in the Democratic-controlled Senate was chair of the 
Judiciary Committee, would that result not also have been political?  
Actually, the controversy over Judge Bork’s nomination reveals only 
the tip of the iceberg of the influence of disciplined American party 
politics over judicial affairs.  It was an exceptional case, but less 
controversy in a confirmation case does not mean the absence of 
politics and political influence; politically non-controversial is not 
politically neutral or politics-free.25  The nomination and confirmation 
of federal judges in the United States is becoming more and more 
political. 
Politics and political interference are evident not only in the 
process of nominating and confirming judges, but also in some 
concrete cases.  The interference comes not only from politicians in 
their role as party leaders, but also through the willing cooperation of 
politicians serving as judges.  Sometimes, such efforts may be out of 
 
 24. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1990). 
 25. A recent empirical study found that “the more important the court, the greater the 
difficulty of having the person confirmed.  Although the confirmation rates have fallen and the 
length of the confirmation process has lengthened dramatically, the ex-post facto measures of 
judicial quality of circuit court nominees . . . or judicial independence have been decreasing over 
time . . . .  The most troubling results strongly indicate that circuit court judges who turn out to 
be the most successful judges . . . faced the most difficult confirmation battles . . .”  The study 
speculates that “[p]ossibly, senators of the party in opposition to the President really care only 
about preventing the best judges from being on the circuit court because they will have the most 
impact.” John R. Lott, Jr., The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty with Being Smart, 2 
J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 407, 443-47 (2005). 
10__BERNSTEIN_LECTURE.DOC 10/4/2007  9:59:16 AM 
546 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:533 
bounds.  The most famous or infamous instance is Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s handling of Marbury v. Madison.26  In that case, there was 
no party leader demanding that he handle the case in a certain way, 
but his aggressive personality and firm party ideology motivated him 
to make perhaps the greatest decision in the American constitutional 
system.  In the last fifty years, the Berger and Rehnquist courts have, 
to a certain degree, been much the same: more political than 
juridical.27  The most recent instance is the controversial case of Bush 
v. Gore.28 
Please note that in no way am I saying that American political 
parties’ influence on the operation of courts is the same as the CCP’s 
influence upon basic courts in China.  The two are very different.  
The United States has a two-party system, while in China, the  
“[Communist] party is the leader of all”;29 in the United States, 
political influence on the judiciary probably comes mainly from 
judges’ self-conscious loyalty to party ideology and platforms, while in 
China the influence is a function of the party’s demands on and 
disciplinary control over judges; and in the United States, with 
lifetime tenure and high salaries as protection, some judges will not 
hesitate to “rebel against” their party,30 while in China, judges, who 
are civil servants, can find comfort only in the supportive writings of a 
few scholars.  Thus, I recognize that in terms of parties’ political 
interference in the judicial system, the differences between China and 
the United States are ones both of degree and character. 
Moreover, I want to point out that nothing I have said implies 
that in the course of transforming its judiciary, China should not study 
the United States and other Western countries.  To the contrary, the 
PRC is in the midst of studying these examples, and out of a concern 
for the need to address China’s problems, I approve and support this 
effort. 
 
 26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 27. LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); EARL 
M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986 (2000); TINSLEY E. 
YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2001); REHNQUIST 
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). 
 28. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). 
 29. 2 MAO ZEDONG, MAO ZEDONG ZHUZUO XUANDU [SELECTED READINGS OF MAO 
ZEDONG’S WORKS] 852 (1986). 
 30. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985). 
10__BERNSTEIN_LECTURE.DOC 10/4/2007  9:59:16 AM 
2007] POLITICAL PARIES IN CHINA’S JUDICIARY 547 
However, the position I have taken above has nothing to do with 
the frame of reference issue with which I want to engage.  The 
question remains: what is the proper frame of reference for 
measuring and evaluating the relationship between party politics and 
the judiciary.  The American?  The British?  The German?  The 
French?  Or should I construct a standard model based on the judicial 
practice of all of the nations in the world?  But why should they be 
basis for the standard, and is that standard appropriate for China?  
From where does such a comparative law model or statistical 
standard derive its normative force?  From where does its justness 
come?  If, as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip 
O’Neil said, “all politics are local,” why should local judicial politics 
adopt a universal standard?  We cannot get to this form of universal 
standards unless I adopt a linear version of modernization theory, 
which I steadfastly reject, but Professor Upham believes I support. 
Should I dismiss all the empirical evidence and directly develop 
an ideal model frame of reference by which to examine the relations 
between the judiciary and political parties?  This is, of course, 
possible and really not that hard.  Or, I should derive such a model 
relationship from the separation of powers (with its Western origins 
and cultural coloring) or other similar concepts?  I believe I can do it 
quite well if practice is not considered.  But then, unless we are an 
essentialist who not only believes that there is one true, correct, 
universal, and transcendent definition of the relationship between 
political parties and the judiciary, but also believes that we have 
perfect access to that definition, we still cannot prove that this ideal 
or deduced model for political party-judicial relations is indeed 
legitimate.  Perhaps it is possible to broaden or loosen the standard a 
bit, consider the national context where a judiciary is located, and 
construct a “comparatively reasonable” relationship between political 
parties and the judiciary.  But methodologically, this would still be an 
artificial construct which would certainly deviate from the American 
standard implicit in Upham’s critique, comparative law’s ideal model, 
or the essentialist standard, because one would have to return to the 
contextualized, consequentialist, functionalist model by which I abide 
in my book.  One must come back to China’s social context, where 
the judiciary operates, and evaluate the relationship between party 
politics, the government, and the judiciary in considering the 
systematic consequences of such a judiciary in the Chinese society.  
Even if all this is possible, it is hard to avoid innumerable 
controversies over the reasonableness of the construct.  For example, 
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I consider that in Sending Law to the Countryside, I constructed a 
reasonable analytical structure and frame of reference for evaluating 
the relationship between the Party and the judiciary, and provided a 
focused discussion of a series of related issues.  However, Professor 
Upham finds in it an absence “of politics and political power.”  
Through numerous, useless publications, we could debate forever the 
reasonableness of the framework, but we will get nowhere. 
I say useless because not all debates end in agreement or 
intellectual enlightenment, and, even we can reach an agreement over 
the frame of reference, does this frame have any practical uses?  
Whether we deduce it from the general, abstract it from empirical 
materials, or make a standard directly out of American or some other 
national experience, in the end, it mainly provides us with just 
another frame of reference for criticizing contemporary Chinese 
judicial practice, making us think that we have truth and justice in our 
hands.  But it does not help us either to understand China’s reality or 
to transform that reality.  Indeed, we may be worse off than we 
started.  This sort of frame of reference is doomed to fail because 
from the beginning, the current relationship between political parties 
and the judiciary is neither derived from a concept or ideology, nor 
modeled on a foreign standard.  The current state of China’s judicial 
practice is a product of China’s modern historical and social 
development, a social reality constructed from various social 
variables. 
IV.  THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE 
My response cannot stop here.  Otherwise, readers may think it 
is not a strong response, but rather at most a defensive pleading for 
my methodology that, even if successful, merely dodges Upham’s 
arrow.  It might enhance the misimpression about the relationship 
between the CCP and the judiciary within China and the implied 
universal, normative character of American-type judicial politics. 
More importantly, such a brief response leaves unexplored topics 
that are inherently deserving of further consideration and it is 
therefore unfair to Chinese contemporary history, the CCP, and the 
Chinese judiciary to stop here.  So, in this section, I want to engage in 
a thought experiment and argue for the contextual reasonableness of 
the relationship between the CCP and the judiciary and for its 
necessity in China’s social transformation.  If my argument is sound, it 
will further demonstrate the problems with Professor Upham’s 
criticism of my book, not only in his methodology, but also in his 
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value judgments.  Further, such a social science analysis of the 
relationship between Party and the judiciary may provide a new 
frame of reference for understanding and evaluating the issue of the 
relationship between the CCP and the PRC’s judiciary.  Even if my 
effort fails, it will advance the academic research on China’s judicial 
system. 
The relationship between the party-state and the judiciary in 
China evolved over the course of China’s modernization.  Since 1840, 
China’s most important task has been to transform itself 
successfully—economically from an agricultural society to an 
industrial and commercial society; politically from a community 
unified by culture to a modern nation-state unified by politics; and 
culturally from an rural society dominated by Confucian humanities 
to an urban one led by the social sciences.31  In terms of key variables 
such as time, population, and geographic size, this was an 
unprecedented historical transformation.  Without a vigorous, core 
political power, it is unimaginable that this change could have 
occurred in such a short time and in the face of a fiercely competitive 
international society.  The early history of the Republic of China is 
clear evidence.  Only when the GMD and CCP appeared as national, 
revolutionary parties and twice cooperated, did Chinese society begin 
its first steps toward unification, and only in Second World War, with 
the assistance from Soviet Union and the United States, did China 
win its first war against foreign invasion since 1840. 
It should be noted that the GMD and CCP are profoundly 
different, but looked at from another angle, whatever their 
differences, both are different from contemporary Western political 
parties.  Both the GMD and CCP were aware that the task and 
historical burden of the nation was the economic, political, cultural, 
and social transformation of China.  To achieve this goal in the wake 
of imperial China’s collapse and in the face of a fiercely competitive 
world, they had to use every possible means to mobilize and integrate 
all political forces in the service of national unity, independence, and 
freedom, which are preconditions to social and economic 
development. What I have described is the process of jianguo, which 
is commonly translated as “state-building.”  I prefer to translate it as 
the constitution (or re-constitution) of the nation-state.  It is in this 
 
 31. ZHU SULI, DAOLU TONGXIANG CHENGSHI—ZHUANXING ZHONGGUO DE FAZHI OF 
[ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES—RULE OF LAW IN A TRANSFORMING CHINA] intro. (2004) 
[hereinafter SULI, ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES]. 
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historical context of constituting the nation-state that the CCP and 
GMD came into being.  In contrast, the political parties in the West 
were established and operated within already-constituted nations.  
They were political organizations that served as vehicles for common 
interests within these constituted nations, and generally speaking, did 
not confront the historical problems and tasks that faced the Chinese 
political parties, nor did they have the long-term political goals of the 
Chinese parties. 
Because of this historical task, both the CCP and GMD were 
revolutionary parties, rather than merely political parties holding 
power.  They had to engage in armed struggle to gain the power, and 
then, even after they gained political power, they had to continue to 
play the role of a revolutionary party, leading society in the 
completion of social revolution, land reform, and industrialization.  
All these historical tasks dictated that both parties were elitist: they 
had to not only be able to propose national reform, but also to 
mobilize and lead the masses to accomplish the transformation in 
order to construct or constitute a modern nation-state, precisely the 
original meaning of constitution.  However, this task could not be 
accomplished by the political elites without the collective effort of the 
nation.  Thus, both parties had to be capable of integrating all kinds 
of other social forces, representing different interests, and in this 
sense, they became the parties of the masses.32  As a consequence of 
this historical context, the CCP and GMD developed not only strong 
political ideologies, but also strict party discipline and tight internal 
organizations to insure effective implementation of party policy.  
Their party structures emphasize “democratic centralism,” “organized 
democracy,” and “disciplined freedom,” which all seem to be 
antinomies or oxymorons, but were actual practices within the 
parties. Party members who violate Party discipline will be sanctioned 
or even expelled.33 
Therefore, such parties are not only an important motivating and 
leading force for social change; they have also been a critical 
institutional alternative in modern Chinese society.  Before they take 
power, they are organizational mechanisms and social mobilizers.  
The party organization, party leaders, and even ordinary party 
members are thus alternatives to the conventional bureaucracy and 
 
 32. Cf. CCP CONST., supra note 14, general princ. [Is the 2002 one being referenced here?  
The year was not noted.]; CONST. OF THE GUOMINDANG preface [hereinafter GMD CONST.]. 
 33. CCP CONST., supra note 14, general princs.; GMD CONST., supra note 32, arts. 3, 4, 5, 
ch. 12. 
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bureaucrats.  Given the absence of the professionals and bureaucrats 
China needed to order its society, after taking power, besides 
continuing their function of social mobilization and organization, the 
parties, to a certain extent, could not but assume the role of the 
bureaucracy, and in the course of that process, their members became 
the bureaucrats that modern China needed.  The so-called party-
state, or rule by the party, that the GMD first proposed and 
emphasized34 is therefore not only natural, but also inevitable.  The 
CCP always opposed the GMD’s idea of “party-state,” but in reality, 
such a pattern characterized the CCP both before,35 and certainly also 
after its victory in 1949.  Indeed, the CCP’s party-state was even more 
pronounced than the GMD’s.  Thus, either the GMD or the CCP has 
been the most important part of the constitutional and governmental 
structure of modern China and the core force of that modernization. 
The Party’s objective is social transformation.  Accordingly, it 
cannot base itself directly on democracy—the people, after all have a 
tendency to be conservative and short-sighted—but must insist on the 
central role of the Party’s elites and leadership group in guiding the 
revolution and social transformation.  But at the same time, in order 
to lead the masses, the Party cannot abandon them.  In order to be 
representative, both the GMD and CCP had to maintain a certain 
degree of internal democracy (whether it was called “democratic 
centralism” or “democracy with organization”).  Parties become a 
quasi-constitutional structure in another sense as they serve as an 
alternative for or a necessary stage on the road toward 
constitutionalism:36 within the party, party discipline and guiding 
principles perform the function of law and statutes.  In his analysis of 
the party-state of China during the twentieth century, Harvard 
professor William C. Kirby pointed out that the goal of a party-state 
is not to lead the government, but to reform the Chinese people and 
 
 34. In 1928, the Standing Committee of the GMD stated that the Party was the Supreme 
Tutelar of the nation.  In 1931, the Nationalist Government invited selected representatives of 
rural society, labor, business, and the education sector to convene and draw up a Tutelary 
Period Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 30 of which specifies that 
during the Tutelary Period, GMD will represent the National Conference to direct and 
supervise the National Government.  XU JUHUA, JIANG JIESHI CHENBAI LU [A RECORD OF 
JIANG JIESHI’S SUCCESS AND FAILURE] ch. 12. 
 35. 1 XIAOPING, supra note 6, at 12. 
 36. Sun Yat-sen proposed three stages to China’s constitutionalism: the period of military 
government, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional government.  See 
Sun Yat-sen, Guomin zhengfu jianguo dagang [A Constitutional Program of the National 
Government], in ZHONGSHEN, supra note 5, at 126-29. 
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recast them into citizens of new nation-state.  The party-state, he 
noted, is a political entity pursuing social and economic development; 
its aim is complete mobilization of all China’s people and total 
industrialization.37 
This historical task cannot be fulfilled within a short period, so 
the party-state structure may last quite long since the taking over 
power does not equal constitutionalism, nor accomplishment of the 
self-imposed historical task.  Parties want to accomplish their ideals 
through the coercive state and governmental power under their 
control.  However, when in power, the requirement of effective and 
stable governance will force parties to gradually adjust their policies; 
to enact laws; to establish conventional institutions, such as the 
National Congress or National People’s Congress; to recruit qualified 
civil servants and set up bureaucracy; and to establish a judiciary and 
improve its function.  It is a long process of transformation from a 
revolutionary party to a governing party, a process of transformation 
from a pioneer and elitist party to a popular party.  Because these 
processes of reformation of the Party and institutionalization of 
modern nation-state take time, they are still ongoing in the PRC. 
Thus, it is understandable why in contemporary China, complete 
judicial independence is impossible and why the relatively low degree 
of party interference in the judiciary in the developed countries of the 
West is not likely to be systematized in China.  Actually, in 
contemporary China, the entire modern state apparatus, including the 
judiciary, consists of inventions created by the governing political 
parties on the basis of their political ideals, policies, and 
organizational structures.  The specific forms, such as the GMD’s 
“partyization of the judiciary,” or the CCP’s “sending law to the 
countryside” and political and judicial committee (zhengfawei) may 
be accidental, but the comprehensive leadership, influence, and 
control of the parties was inevitable and pervasive.  Thus, we have the 
phenomenon that I have described above: in contemporary China, it 
is well nigh impossible to distinguish what is and what is not the 
CCP’s influence and interference, for in fact the judiciary is the CCP’s 
creation. 
Although GMD and CCP had some commonalities, there were 
also significant differences between them, most notably the different 
 
 37. William C. Kirby, Renshi 20 Shiji zhongguo [Understanding China of Twentieth 
Century], 2001 21ST CENTURY, no. 10, 114-24 (2001), available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/ 
wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1523. 
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social forces that they integrated and represented.  From the 1920s 
onward, the GMD inherited most of the technocrats from the late 
Qing dynasty, as well as the vast majority of professionals and mid- to 
upper-level intellectuals, for, as the party in power, the GMD 
provided them with room for their knowledge and skill.  Moreover, 
another major constituent force of the GMD was the military officers 
who had graduated from the Huangpu Military College and who 
served as another institutional alternative to the bureaucracy. 
By contrast, despite consistently seeking a united front during its 
military struggles, the CCP had no way to attract the broad 
participation of such groups, not only because it had no space to 
deploy their skills, but also because for these elites, the CCP was a 
much riskier choice, especially in its military struggle for national 
power.  Moreover, unlike the GMD, the CCP also did not have a 
captive military college to train its officers, who instead got their 
experience and skills on the battlefields.  During wartime, most 
military officers of the CCP were trained in the battlefields.  Thus, the 
CCP was less capable than the GMD of utilizing modern or Para-
modern institutions and professionals. 
The CCP membership came mainly from peasants and other mid 
and lower social classes.  Because of the peasants’ mode of 
production, they tended to be less modern, less disciplined, and less 
likely to be long-term thinkers.  Thus, in order for the CCP to rely on 
this mass base to make a successful revolution, it had to develop 
stronger party organization and leadership, stricter discipline, and a 
more radical ideology. 38  There is substantial research to show that 
during the time that the GMD held power on the mainland, the actual 
political power and influence of its party organization and party 
members was substantially weaker than similarly situated CCP party 
organizations and cadres.  For example, the GMD’s propaganda and 
organization ministers were much less influential than the CCP’s.  
Such evidence is abundant.39  The differences between the CCP and 
GMD lie in the social conditions from which they were constructed; 
the ideological differences may not have been as important as many 
people think. 
The CCP’s stronger party organization and ideology 
compensated for its lack of a bureaucratic system for modern 
 
 38. Cf. 1 MaoZedong, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, in Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong, vol. 1, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975. 
 39. See supra note 8. 
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government, but they also impeded the creation and development of 
such a bureaucracy.  Of course, the CCP felt no urgent need for a 
bureaucracy, and long after it took power in 1949, it remained a 
revolutionary party in character.  There was no quick transformation 
into a governing party; there was no effective formation of a decent 
bureaucracy with technocrats, civil servants, and professionals, such 
as judges and lawyers.  In all aspects of governance, the CCP played a 
decisive and dominant role.  Political loyalty and ideological purity 
became the important criteria for selecting government employees, 
including those in the judiciary.40 
Not until the 1980s did the CCP began to emphasize knowledge 
and human talent, seeking to create a reformed cohort of cadres who 
were more knowledgeable, professional, specialized, and younger.  
This trend was fostered by the steady, rapid development of higher 
education and a dramatic increase in university graduates.  The 1993 
Provisional Civil Service Act,41 which replaced recruitment through 
political channels with selection by open, competitive exams,42 
symbolizes this fundamental change.  Similarly, the 1990s appearance 
of criticism of the practice of discharged military officers serving as 
judges43 was not accidental.  Though it was initiated in academic 
circles, it found an echo in the court system itself, indicating the rise 
and increasing influence in the judiciary of the first generation of 
post-Cultural Revolution trained legal professionals (most of whom 
were around forty years old).  They constituted a challenge for the 
established institutional structure in the judiciary and led a series of 
judicial reforms.44 
 
 40. Cf. DONG BIWU, DONG BIWU FAXUE WENJI [LEGAL WORKS OF DONG BIWU] (2001). 
 41. Guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli [Provisional Civil Service Act] (promulgated by the 
State Council, Aug. 14, 1993, effective Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.china.org.cn/ 
chinese/MATERIAL/385908.htm.  On January 1, 2006, the Provisional Act was superceded by 
the Civil Servant Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan fa).  For the Chinese version, 
see the website of the National People’s Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/ 
zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=337350&pdmc=110106.  For an English language version, see 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/t20060620_5
0863.jsp. 
 42. For a discussion of this Act, which is compared to the Pendleton Act that created the 
United States Civil Service, see King K Tsao & John Abbott Worthley, Chinese Public 
Administration: Change with Continuity during Political and Economic Development, 55 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1995, at 169-74. 
 43. He Weifang, Fuzhuan junren jin fayuan [Discharged Military Officers Come to the 
Courts], NANFANG ZHOUMO, Jan. 2, 1998. 
 44. Renmin fayue wunian gaige gangyao [A Five-Year Program for the Reform of People’s 
Courts], 1999 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO, no. 6 
(1999). 
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In the mid-1980s, the CCP proposed separating party and 
government, but progress has been neither fast nor significant.45  It 
seems to me that a prominent (though not the only) problem is that 
parallel duplicative systems address the same matter—the Party and 
the government have separate but corresponding organizations and 
personnel.  Moreover, the logic of the Party organization impedes its 
becoming the logic of an organization with specialized functions.46  
High transaction costs sharply reduce work efficiency.  Also, because 
of the Party’s hold on power, opportunists can use their position to 
use ideological language to expand their influence and serve their 
self-interest.  Thus, the Party has consistently promoted strengthening 
and improving party leadership,47 as well as establishing a new 
relationship between the Party and the judiciary.48  China still faces an 
enormous task of reform, and its performance is still subjected to 
withering criticism from Western governments and scholars, much of 
which is driven by their own ideology.  I admit that some criticism is 
justified and deserves the CCP’s attention.  However, historically, 
functionally, and consequentially, China under the CCP’s leadership 
and governance has achieved great success.  Most notably, the CCP 
created a unique, innovative path to modernization in a country with 
a large peasant economy and no modern constitution or political 
institutions.  Today, China’s political system may not entirely meet 
our expectations, but the practical question is whether abolishing the 
current system of CCP leadership would make China better off and 
develop faster in the future, or, to put it as a counterfactual, without 
 
 45. Deng Xiaoping raised this idea in June 1986.  3 XIAOPING, supra note 6, at 164.  In 
September of that year, he further pointed out that the separation of Party and state should be 
the top priority political reform.  Id. at 179.  Then, in October 1987, the 13th meeting of the CCP 
Party Congress adopted Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s report, Yanzhe you zhongguo 
tesede shuihuizhuyi daolu qianjin [Advancing Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics], thereby formally listing party-state separation as the key to and the primary 
task in reforming the political system. 
 46. Su Li, Fayuan de shenpan zhineng yu xingzheng guanli [The Adjudicative Function of 
Courts and Administrative Management], 1999 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [CHINESE FOREIGN 
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 5 (1999).  Su Li is a pen name used by Zhu Suli. 
 47. Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu gaige [Reforming the System of Party and State 
Leadership], August 18, 1980, in 2 XIAOPING, supra note 6. 
 48. For some of the most recent attempts, see Shenzhen jiangcheng dangzheng fenli 
zheng’gai xianfeng [Shenzhen at the Forefront of the Political Reform Separating Party from 
Government], GONGSHANG SHIBAO, Jan. 14, 2003.  According to the article, this was the largest 
political reform since the Party took power in 1949.  Its key component was the separation of 
the Party from the administrative and legislative systems, leading toward a Shenzhen municipal 
government with a Western-style separation of powers, in which the municipal government, the 
municipal government, and the courts were in a mutual balance of power. 
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the CCP, could China have accomplished what it has accomplished.  I 
think not.  In the last thirty years, to an extent, the CCP actually has 
transformed itself and successfully led China’s reform and social 
modernization. 
This statement holds true for the judiciary.  Although the recent 
judicial reforms have, to an extent, been in response to pressures 
accompanying economic transformation, the real organizational and 
motivating force has been the CCP, including its leaders and 
intellectuals.  Reform has been implemented as a consequence of 
Party principles and policies and through the exertion of party 
organization discipline within the judiciary.  I do not think every 
reform measure is good or desirable, but on balance their benefits 
outweigh their defects.49  For example, although the CCP’s control 
seriously compromises the independence of the judicial system, 
especially the independence of judges, in the absence of alternative 
institutions that are not yet fully in place during this time of social 
transformation, to some extent Party control has limited the 
corruption, laxness, and partiality of the judiciary.  This last point, I 
should note, is the subject of considerable controversy among lawyers 
and legal scholars.  I, personally, respect others’ criticism, but 
conclusions about China’s judicial system cannot be reached simply 
through debates; they will come as the result of empirical research, 
which requires time.  I do not want to rush to judgment and am 
willing to be critiqued and rebutted, but if we are to research China’s 
modernization, especially the relationship between the Party, the 
state, and the judicial system, then we must look at the question with 
an open mind and take into account the historical and social context 
of these institutions.  Evaluations and judgments based solely on 
Western experience or ideology, or out of the strategic considerations 
of Western politicians have no academic value or possible practical 
applicability.  From the perspective of democratic theory and 
evolutionary economics, valid institutional development and 
innovation arises from competition.  The vicissitudes along the road 
of social development are not predetermined.  The same is true for 
the evolving relationship between the party-state and the judicial 
system.  It is therefore critical for us to examine this relationship as 
scholars and not as ideologues. 
 
 49. Cf. SULI, ALL ROADS LEAD TO CITIES, supra note 31. 
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V.  A NEW MODEL FOR THE  
STUDIES OF CHINA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Once we understand the role that the CCP has played in modern 
China in social mobilization and representation, in nation building, 
and in the creation of institutions, then we must maintain a degree of 
moderate academic vigilance against the apparently successful 
Western experience with the judiciary and rule of law.  Vigilance is 
not hostility.  Rather, simply because of current Western institutions’ 
ostensible success, we should not take them as a decontextualized 
standard when they are in fact embedded in and abstracted from 
particular historical and theoretical contexts. And then, once China 
fails to comport with this standard, it becomes an object for 
politicized academic criticism and reform.  Such an approach is fairly 
common among both Western and Chinese scholars.  I am not 
accusing them of intentionally using ideology as a critical standard.  
Many of them work hard to understand China and wish it well.  
However, their social experience imperceptibly impedes them from 
placing themselves in the position of the Chinese and considering 
China’s current situation from a value-neutral perspective.  
Inevitably, our life experience impedes and defines the scope of our 
imagination. 
Beyond their social environment and history, what has also 
influenced Western scholars, and through them some Chinese 
scholars as well, is Western scholarship on the relationship between 
the party-state and the judiciary in the former Soviet Union and 
communist countries in Eastern Europe.  This scholarship and its 
underlying theoretical framework may have prevented them from 
realizing the uniqueness of China’s experience.  In the Soviet Union 
and formerly communist Eastern European countries, the major 
function of the Communist Party was seen to be, and indeed is, to 
control the bureaucracy, including the judicial professionals who had 
been in place before the Communist Party existed.  This research not 
only enhanced the notion of an inherent separation of and conflict of 
interests between the Communist Party and the bureaucracy, it also 
left the impression that the bureaucracy always came first and that 
Party control followed.  This conclusion is reasonable and, 
considering the context of these countries, possibly correct.  For 
example, in the Soviet Union’s early years, many Red Army generals, 
such as the famous Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevieh Tukhachevsk and 
the hero of World War II, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, 
were previously military officers of the Tsar.  In order to secure its 
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leadership and control, the Communist Party sent political 
commissars to ensure the implementation of the party’s lines in the 
Red Army.  The Party followed the same approach in many 
enterprises and governmental agencies, and this practice was followed 
by other Eastern European countries. 
China, however, was not like this.  Long before CCP took power 
in China, its leaders clearly understood that China was different from 
the Soviet Union.  In 1936, when a presidium political commissar, 
Yang Chengwu, was reappointed as the military commander, Mao 
Zedong explained the difference between the Soviet Red Army was 
and the Chinese one: in the Soviet Union, political commissars were 
sent to supervise military officers, most of whom were former White 
Army officers, while in China all the military officers and political 
military officers in the Red Army were trained by the CCP and 
experienced in combat.50  Yang Chengwu later became one of the 
most famous generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but 
few knew that he had previously served as a political commissar; 
Yang was not unique in the PLA.  His career path, like that of 
individuals in other professions, was common. 
Therefore, the model abstracted from the experiences of the 
former Soviet bloc is not entirely appropriate for modern China.  In 
modern China, whether the GMD or the CCP, and whether before or 
after one of these parties held power, to varying degrees the general 
pattern was that the party preceded the government, the judiciary, 
and the armed forces.  Before the GMD and CCP, there was hardly a 
modern nation-state, government, judiciary, and army.51  There is 
some truth in the CCP propaganda, “without the CCP there is no new 
China.”  Thus, the time sequence of the appearance of the Party and 
the modern institutions of China demands a new framework or model 
of research. 
As I have said, this paper aims partly at Chinese scholars of the 
current legal system because some of them avoid any discussion of 
political parties.  It may be from disgust with the extreme leftist 
politics of the Cultural Revolution, fear, or excessive sensitivity.  
 
 50. YANG CHENGWU, YANG CHENGWU HUIYILU [MEMOIRS OF YANG CHENGWU] 334 
(1987). 
 51. The first national conference of the GMD convened in 1924, and the first military 
college, Huangpu Military Academy, which became the major source of soldiers for the national 
army under the GMD, opened in 1925.  The national government of the GMD took power in 
1927.  The first national conference of the CCP convened in 1921, the Chinese Red Army was 
founded in 1927, and the CCP national government took power in 1949. 
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However, as I have argued in this essay, their unwillingness to deal 
with the CCP may also simply reflect their practice of labeling the 
particular experience of the as a universal theoretical framework for 
legal systems.  This approach leads to two sorts of responses in 
dealing with the issue of Party influence.  One is to list examples of 
the glorious history of judicial independence in foreign countries.  
Either they think that they will persuade the Chinese people, 
government, and Communist Party to carry out judicial reform or 
even revolution on the basis of the Western model, or they hope that 
they by not talking about Party influence on the judiciary, it can be 
made to gradually disappear.  This is not an unreasonable strategy for 
pushing judicial reform, but I doubt that it can be successful and find 
it naïve.  It cannot be successful because the Party and government’s 
influence are a historically constructed and established fact.  Whether 
one likes it or not, the Party is an integral component around which 
the judicial system revolves.  If one wants to reform the legal system, 
then one has to face this situation directly. 
Another common approach by some Chinese scholars is to 
oppose the Party’s involvement and treat it as a historical mistake 
rather than understand how the current system happened.  They do 
not look for or do not see the variables that constitute the cause and 
effect relationship that explains China’s current system.  Because they 
insist on using an idealist historical point of view rather than a 
materialist one from which to understand the history of the judicial 
system, they cannot see that the Party was, from the outset, an 
external force in the system, but one that is now fully integrated.  
They persist in imagining the glorious moment in which an unsullied 
legal system emerged and thereafter and forever remained innocent, 
flawless, and pure.  This sort of hope is very important in establishing 
the courage and commitment for judicial reform, but it is of little 
advantage in successfully accomplishing that reform. 
Against these two approaches, I would argue that in studying 
contemporary China, one must treat either the GMD or CCP as a 
constituent element of the political and legal system or as a 
constitutional structure.  That implies that no matter how much it 
deviates from “the standard” or the experience of Western countries, 
the system should be seen as something normal and not as a freak or 
an anomaly produced by mistaken theories and viewpoints.  And 
despite the current system’s weaknesses, problems, and even 
mistakes, nearly all of which are in some way directly or indirectly 
connected to the Party’s influence, one cannot ignore the Party’s 
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positive contributions, which are often the flip-side of what is 
perceived as negative. 
Without question, what was reasonable and ideal yesterday does 
not necessarily remain so today.  Today, in the wake of China’s 
reform and development, the relationship between the Party and the 
judicial system certainly needs adjustment and reform.  Whether the 
path to reform is the 1980s approach of separating Party from state, 
Jiang Zemin’s “three representatives” (sange daibiao) approach of 
enlarging the party’s representativeness, or something else, they all 
require careful, attentive long-term work from those involved with 
the law.  However, the effect of history means that we cannot start 
anew.  If we cannot treat seriously China’s adjudicature of yesterday, 
then there is no way to understand its adjudicature of today or to 
anticipate what it will be in the future.  The past is one of the 
variables in the current system and will certainly influence 
tomorrow’s.  For the sake not only of legal scholarship, but also of 
legal practice, the Party’s role in the judiciary and in administration of 
justice must be objectively understood and not treated as an 
abstraction. 
I am not making a value judgment about whether the Chinese 
model of the Party as preceding and shaping government, judiciary, 
and even the army is good or right.  What I am suggesting is that we 
revise the theoretical model for studying and understanding the 
relationship between the Party and modern China and base it on the 
Chinese experience.  My aim is to make effective, practical, and, most 
importantly, constructive suggestions for China’s social, political, and 
judicial reform.  Even though I am expecting to be criticized or even 
condemned by people from both the left and right for what I said in 
this essay—in particular for my undifferentiated treatment of the 
CCP and GMD and for my depiction of the CCP as a constitutional 
alternative in China’s social transformation, I welcome such criticism 
because it may prove that I have done something right. 
